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Break-glass accounts done right

Emergency access accounts are the one thing you hope never to use and must never get wrong. A practical checklist for setting them up and keeping them safe.

2 min read⚠ checked 12 Nov 2025Entra ID · Security · Conditional Access
On this page
  1. The setup
  2. Authentication
  3. Conditional Access
  4. Monitoring
  5. Test it
  6. Writing the procedure

If a policy locks everyone out, your provider has an outage, or your federation service goes down, you need a way back in. That's what emergency access, or "", accounts are for.

Must not depend on

  • On-premises AD or sync
  • Federation (AD FS)
  • A single person's phone
  • PIM activation
  • Conditional Access policies

Should have

  • Cloud-only .onmicrosoft.com username
  • Permanent Global Administrator
  • FIDO2 keys stored securely
  • An alert on every sign-in
  • Regular tested use
What emergency accounts must and mustn't depend on.
  1. 01Two cloud-only accounts
  2. 02Permanent Global Admin
  3. 03FIDO2 keys in separate safes
  4. 04Excluded from Conditional Access
  5. 05Alert on every sign-in

The setup

  • Two accounts, so one can be used while the other is investigated or has its credentials rotated.
  • Cloud-only, using the .onmicrosoft.com domain. They mustn't depend on on-premises AD, sync or federation.
  • Permanent Global Administrator, not eligible. PIM is one more thing that could fail during an emergency.
  • Not tied to a person. No mailbox you rely on, no personal phone number.

Authentication

Microsoft now enforces MFA for sign-ins to Azure and the admin portals, and that includes emergency accounts. The best option is phishing-resistant: security keys, registered to each account and stored securely in separate physical locations. Keep a backup key for each.

Conditional Access

Exclude at least one break-glass account from every Conditional Access policy, so a broken policy can't lock it out. The easiest way is a dedicated exclusion group used consistently across policies. Review the group's membership regularly, because it's a high-value target.

Monitoring

These accounts should almost never sign in, so any sign-in is worth an alert. With sign-in logs in :

kql
SigninLogs
| where UserPrincipalName in~ ("bg-admin1@contoso.onmicrosoft.com", "bg-admin2@contoso.onmicrosoft.com")
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AppDisplayName, ResultType

Turn that into an alert rule that notifies the security team immediately.

Test it

Every few months, sign in with each account, confirm the key works and the alert fires, and record the test. An emergency account nobody has tested isn't an emergency account.

Writing the procedure

An emergency is the worst time to work out the steps. Write a one-page procedure and store it where it can be found when Entra is unavailable, such as a sealed envelope or a password manager outside your tenant. Include:

  • Who is allowed to use the accounts and who must approve it.
  • Where the keys are kept and who holds access to each location.
  • What to do first once signed in, for example disabling the broken Conditional Access policy.
  • Who to tell afterwards, and how to reset and re-secure the account.
AdminSafeEntra IDSecurity teamRetrieves FIDO2 key(two people)1Signs in as break-glass account2Alert: break-glasssign-in3Fixes the problem4Records what was done5Returns key; accountreviewed6
What a well-run break-glass sign-in looks like.

This post was last checked against Microsoft's documentation over six months ago. The approach should still hold, but check the linked sources for anything that has changed before you act on it.

Next in Conditional Access from zero · part 2 of 7Test Conditional Access safely with report-only mode and What If →Next in Locking down admin access · part 2 of 6Activate PIM roles from PowerShell with Microsoft Graph →